Introduction to the Topical Issue "Cognitive Linguistics and Theology"
https://doi.org/10. 1515/opth-2018-0042 The contributors to this topical issue use an approach known as cognitive linguistics. Cognitive linguistics is not a specific theory but an approach to language shaped by cognitive science.1 It began in the 1970's with the work of Charles Fillmore, Eleanor Rosch, and George Lakoff.2 They developed an alternative to formal linguistics and the modular understanding of the mind. Instead of one set of principles that explain grammar and another set that explain language use, cognitive linguists searched for general principles that could be applied to all areas of language. They examined how humans go about categorizing their experience and identified other mental tools (such as metaphor) that humans use to reason about their experience in the world. The research led to empirical and cross-linguistic studies to confirm these general principles. They elaborated a number of the mental tools humans use to reason and speak about our experience. In the past thirty years, cognitive linguistics has become incredibly influential in many fields such as psychology but theologians are only beginning to use it. This topical issue shows some of the benefits when theologians use this approach.
Cognitive linguistics is grounded in cognitive science and is interdisciplinary in scope. It holds that our understanding of how language works must line up with the findings about how the human mind works from a range of disciplines. Embodied cognition is key to this approach.3 Human thinking is dependent upon the sensorimotor capacities available to humans. What we know and can understand arises from the particular types of bodies humans have that enable us to interact with entities in our environment in specific ways. The same neuro-anatomical capacities that allow us to see, hear, move around, and grasp objects also shape our conceptual structures. For example, we have rudimentary conceptual organizational structures known as image schemas that arise from repeated patterns of interaction with other entities in childhood. A few examples of these are up/down, in/out, front/back, part/whole, and balance. These cognitive structures depend upon the specific types of bodies humans have. Humans have faces and so we use concepts such as in front of. If humans had bodies like jellyfish, then we would not use the cognitive structure of front/back.
Cognitive linguistics identifies the panhuman tools as well as some of the specific concepts shared in all languages. The basic building blocks for language arise from notions such as the image schemas derived from repeated correlations with our experience. We use mental tools such as categorization, metaphor, and metonymy to expand these basic notions into fuller concepts. For example, from our experience of putting objects into a pile or water into containers we develop what are called primary metaphors such as more is up. As we increase a pile of sticks the pile gets higher. No language has been discovered which has the metaphor more is down. Another example is now is here in which the individual self (body) signifies the present moment of time. When people gesture to indicate the present moment, they point to the body or where the body is standing. This seems to be a panhuman concept.
Of course, there is tremendous variation in languages. Though all humans use the human body to identify the present moment, the orientation of past and future varies across languages. Most languages refer to the future as in front of the human body and the past as in back of the body. For instance, English speakers say "My future is ahead of me." However, several languages think of the future as behind the body so they say, "My future is behind me." People who speak these different languages gesture either in front of them or behind them to signify the future depending on the language. Both views make sense when we understand the metaphors in play. Conceptualizing the future as in front of the person uses the concept of a journey. When traveling we are going to our future and where we have been, the past, is behind us. If a language selects travel to understand time, then the future will be in front of them. However, some languages use the metaphor seeing is knowing to understand past and future. In this case, what you can know is what you have seen. You can know the past so it is in front of your vision while the future is not visible so it is understood as behind us. Embodied cognition undergirds all of these concepts but the particular concepts used are sometimes determined by historical and even geographic concerns.
Different cultures and languages use the same embodied architecture of the human mind, yet they produce incredible variation. People can use the same physical hammers and saws but construct quite different buildings or furniture. In the same way, languages use the same mental tools, yet the can produce different and even novel ideas. Cognitive linguistics examines the kinds of reasoning tools humans share in common along with the different ways specific cultures and languages use the same tools to produce different concepts.
Several of the mental tools that have been studied by cognitive linguists are used by the contributors to this volume so a few words of introduction will be helpful. Categorization is a tool used to organize and order our experiences. Western thought has commonly held that the mind orders things according to necessary and sufficient conditions. According to this view, every member of a category has identical features and each member is just a good example of the category as any other member. However, empirical research demonstrated this to be false. Studies show that people think in terms of prototypes or best examples of a category. For instance, Americans judge that robins are more representative of the category bird than are eagles and eagles are better representatives than penguins. Hence, categories are graded concepts with the best examples at the center and then radiating outwards are good examples followed by lessor ones. This means that categories can have fuzzy boundaries where it is not clear whether an entity is included or not. For example, you might decide that one person is clearly a Christian while you may be unsure about someone else. In this issue, Rinderknecht and Shaver use cognitive linguistic understandings of categorization and prototypes to make progress on some old theological impasses.
Human minds use tools that efficiently help us to construct meaning. Metonymy is an extremely common tool that provides mental access to a target subject. Metonymy occurs when entity A stands for entity B (e. g., the "arm" of God stands for the ability of God to deliver from harm). In this way one need not explain an entire concept or process. One can activate the concept of divine assistance simply by using the term "arm." Metonymies have governing principles that guide their use. For instance, the interactional over non-interactional principle states that we often use the part of an entity we interact with to stand for the entire entity or process. This occurs when we say "Mary is at the wheel" to refer to driving a car. The wheel is the most salient part of the car with which we interact. In this issue, Stein uses metonymy and cognitive scripts (discussed below) to solve a puzzle about the identity of figures who deliver messages from God in the book of Genesis.
Frames are another important tool. If I say, "Rodrigo went to church" your mind will tap into a vast collection of ideas about what church buildings look like along with the typical events that take place during a service. Using the word "church" prompts the mind to fill in enormous amounts of background information. Of course, this background knowledge is available only to some people. For those who have the frame restaurant in their mental warehouse, one simply has to use the term restaurant and other minds will construct the scenario of what typically happens when you go to a restaurant. The mind has a cognitive script containing information about menus, ordering food, paying for it, and the like. A frame can involve complex cognitive models such as the two Howe discusses in her article. Howe notes that politicians can use particular words to activate a specific frame in the minds of the audience and this frame will incline those who affirm its values to vote for particular policies. Understanding the particular frame in play may allow us to "reframe" the issue.
Before moving on to other mental tools, I want to note that the topics just discussed illustrate a key idea in cognitive linguistics: language is the tip of an enormous cognitive iceberg. Very sparse words and grammar prompt for the construction of meaning. Meaning is not fully encapsulated in words and grammar. Human minds have enormous amounts of background information and language prompts us to build a meaning that makes the most sense in a particular setting. Language is the visible part of the many unseen cognitive operations going on in the mind.
The next tool in our survey is metaphor. Conceptual metaphor theory is one of the most highly developed and empirically tested tools identified by cognitive linguistics. It is a cognitive tool humans use to think with and is not simply a rhetorical device. For example, English speakers understand love through metaphors such as nutrients (her love sustains him), magnetism (he is strongly attracted to her), and as a journey (we have come a long way together). A metaphor is a tool in which we understand a "target" topic such as love in terms of a "source" domain such as nutrients or travel. The cognitive structure of the source domain is applied to the target and so, for example, we think of love as if it were a journey together. Metaphors have inferences and different metaphors have different entailments. For instance, the target domain of sin can be understood through source domains such as lawbreaking, being lost, or being sick. If sin is lawbreaking, then the individual is guilty of a crime and deserves punishment. However, if sin is being lost or ill, then the person needs to found or healed, not punished. Different understandings of sin lead to very different theologies of salvation. Studies show that metaphors shape our assessment of what the situation is and what needs to be done. For instance, in an experiment participants were given a report about crime in a city and were asked what should be done. Unnoticed by the participants was the use of the metaphors depicting crime as either a virus or a wild beast. Subjects who read the report that used the word "virus" said the city needed social reforms to prevent crime while those who read the report that used "wild beast" said criminals should be rounded up and given harsher penalties. The metaphors we use in our theologies lead us to particular conclusions and values so it is important to notice them. Many of the articles in this topical issue make use of conceptual metaphor theory. In particular, Schlesinger uses it to suggest a new way of understanding the meaning of sacrifice.
Blending theory is a more recent development in cognitive linguistics. It classifies metaphors as "single scope blends" in which the mental structure of the source domain is mapped onto the target. It is called "single" because only one source domain, such as virus, is used to understand the target. What are called "double scope" or "multi-scope" blends use two or more inputs in order to understand the topic. Cognitive structure is taken from multiple sources and blended to produce a particular concept. Counterfactual reasoning such as "If I were you, I would go to college" is an example of this type of blend. So are typological relations such as occur in some of the stained glass windows in Chartres Cathedral. For instance, the scene of the binding of Isaac is set beside the crucifixion of Jesus. The artwork compresses (blends) the different time periods of these events together. Another example occurs in Jeremiah 18:6 which says God is a potter and Israel is the clay. God seeks to mold the clay into a particular vessel but the clay refuses. Jeremiah blends information from two inputs. The first input is what we know about potters and clay and the second is the covenant between Yahweh and Israel. In the covenant relationship both parties are agents with responsibilities to the other. In the domain of potters and clay there is only one responsible agent, the potter, and a malleable substance. When the two inputs are blended a new structure emerges in which clay has the characteristic of agency and is responsible for the shape it takes. The articles by Gomola, Rinderknecht, Roberts, and Masson use blending theory to provide insight into several theological issues.
Most of the authors in this topical edition use one or more of the mental tools just explained in order to better understand a particular theological topic. The articles provide additional explanation of these tools than this brief introduction can provide. The articles by Kidd and Harries, however, do not focus on a particular tool. Rather, they apply the general framework of embodied reasoning to some theological issues. The range of articles in this volume illustrates the various ways cognitive linguistics benefits theological exploration on topics such as the Roman Catholic claim to be the true church, how the American debate over health care should be framed, and the insights into theological anthropology from research on embodied cognition.
Before closing, I want to highlight something that has been implicit thus far. There is no distinct part of the brain or mind that is designated for religious experience or thought. We have no mental tools specifically allocated to think about the divine. Rather, we use the same set of tools to think about God and salvation that we use to think about chairs or politics. That is why a study of the human mental tools and the principles by which they operate is important for theology.
It is encouraging to see a growing list of publications that adopt a cognitive linguistics approach.4 Biblical scholars have been using cognitive linguistics for over two decades and they have produced a sizeable amount of scholarship yielding incredible insights into biblical texts.5 The Society of Biblical Literature has a study group focused on cognitive linguistics but I am not aware of a similar research group by theologians. Recently, two theologians have produced volumes that apply cognitive linguistics to a variety of theological topics. 
